Opening: A Top Division With No Safety Net
Indian football’s top division is trying to stage a season without the three pillars that normally make a league investable: a long‑term commercial partner, predictable central revenue, and a stable competition format. The All India Football Federation (AIFF) set a 1 January deadline for Indian Super League (ISL) clubs to confirm participation and choose a preferred format, but that deadline has effectively morphed into a negotiation point rather than a clean sign‑off.
At the core, this remains a governance and capital‑structure crisis: the old single‑promoter model has ended, but the new model, central rights partner, revenue‑sharing framework, and regulatory alignment with the AFC does not yet exist.

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What’s Actually Happening:
AIFF wrote to all 14 ISL clubs asking them to confirm participation for the delayed 2025–26 season and indicate their preferred competition format.
This information is needed urgently to:
File licensing details with the AFC, including final format and match count for India’s top division.
Report to India’s Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports by 2 January, with Supreme Court scrutiny on governance and tenders resuming shortly after.
Because most player contracts run only until 31 May, the season has to be squeezed into a five‑month window, which clashes directly with Asian competition requirements.
After the Deadline = Conditional Participation, Not a Green Light:
The 1 January deadline has now passed, but instead of a simple “yes” from the clubs, AIFF has received a collective “yes, but…”
A joint response from 13 of the 14 clubs says they are “ready and willing” to restart ISL only if two core conditions are met:
No participation fee for this season.
AIFF assumes primary financial responsibility for running the league.
This letter was sent in reply to AIFF’s 31 December communication, turning the 24‑hour ultimatum into a leverage moment and making participation explicitly conditional, not unconditional.
In other words, as of today, there is still no public indication that all clubs have signed off on a final format or that AIFF has accepted these terms; instead, the bargaining power has shifted toward a united club bloc on the very day AIFF must brief the government.
Clubs vs AIFF: Who Carries the Risk Now?
The immediate flashpoint is who underwrites the league now that the previous private promoter agreement has lapsed. The new joint letter from 13 clubs effectively hardens those demands into a common negotiating position, making it difficult for AIFF to proceed with any format that pushes costs down onto individual balance sheets.
From a capital‑structure perspective, the system has inverted: previously, a private promoter absorbed risk in exchange for long‑term rights and upside; now, with that contract gone, risk is being pushed down toward clubs and up toward the federation, but without a new rights‑holder framework to capture future upside.
The AFC’s 24‑Match Rule Meets a 31 May Wall:
Layered on top of the financial and governance uncertainty is hard regulation from the Asian Football Confederation.
AFC licensing rules effectively require clubs in the top division to play at least 24 domestic matches in a season (league plus domestic cup) to retain Asian competition eligibility.
With the delayed start and a hard stop of 31 May due to contract end‑dates, clubs argue that a traditional home‑and‑away league plus cup schedule is impossible without overloading players and budgets.
ISL clubs have therefore asked AIFF to seek a one‑off relaxation from the AFC so that India can maintain continental slots even if domestic match volume falls below the 24‑game benchmark this season.
System design (AFC rules) and asset reality (contract timelines, finances) are misaligned, turning scheduling into a regulatory and capital‑allocation problem.
Format on the Table: Centralised, Short, and Cheap:
Multiple coordination meetings between AIFF and clubs in late December have narrowed the conversation toward compressed, cost‑controlled options.
The leading proposal currently looks like:
A single‑round league at a central venue (with Goa a strong candidate).
Around 12 league matches per club, roughly 78 games in total.
Estimated cost of about ₹2–3 crore per club for participation under this centralised model.
This would be the lightest top‑division calendar since India moved away from tournament‑style competitions in the mid‑1990s and would almost certainly require special dispensation from the AFC to keep Asian slots.
From an investor’s lens, this is emergency surgery: minimise variable costs, preserve top‑division status, and buy time to solve the rights and sponsorship question.
Why This Is a Governance & Capital‑Structure Crisis:
Seen from 30,000 feet, this story is less about fixtures and more about who owns risk, who owns rights, and how future cash flows are shared.
The league was built on a private‑promoter model where one commercial partner (FSDL) held long‑term rights and took the capital risk of building a product, in return for deep control and economic upside.
That agreement has now effectively expired or been allowed to lapse without a new long‑term structure in place, leaving:
AIFF trying to run a top division directly, manage regulatory relations, and tender fresh rights.
Clubs being asked to commit capex and opex for a season without clarity on central distributions.
AFC rules and domestic ministry expectations pressing on timelines and structure.
The 1 January deadline was supposed to restore order; instead, the 2 January reality is a vacuum: no anchor investor, no guaranteed media‑rights cash, and no fully agreed governance framework that balances federation control, club influence, and commercial partner incentives. For global sports‑investment readers, this is what a “transition year” looks like when you unwind a promoter‑driven league model faster than you can architect the replacement.

What to Watch Next:
New rights tender: Whether AIFF can quickly secure a media/commercial partner on terms that still leave upside for clubs while funding central operations.
Club bloc strategy: If 13 clubs hold their line on “no fee, AIFF pays”, they effectively become a bargaining unit in a system that historically sidelined them from top‑tier commercial decisions.
AFC flexibility: Any one‑off relaxation of the 24‑match requirement will set a precedent for how far confederations will bend to help leagues navigate calendar and governance shocks.
Regulatory overlay: The interaction between AIFF’s restructuring, ministry reporting obligations, and Supreme Court oversight could hard‑code new governance norms into the statute and constitution of Indian football.
Valuation reset: A thinner season with less inventory, uncertain central rights, and visible governance risk will almost certainly reset how broadcasters, sponsors, and private capital price Indian football for the next cycle.
Right now, India’s top division is trying to prove it can function as a real league, with credible governance, predictable cash flows, and Asian eligibility without the training wheels of a single private promoter. Whether it succeeds will decide not just this season’s schedule, but the price of Indian football as an investable asset class in the 2030s.



