Cricket Australia (CA) is weighing a partial sell‑down of its Big Bash League (BBL) franchises that could raise between AUS$600m and AUS$800m, effectively repricing Australian cricket as a serious player in the global franchise asset class.

The working model would see 49% of six clubs sold, with the option for investors to acquire 100% of one Melbourne and one Sydney franchise, a key lever to push aggregate proceeds into the upper end of the range.

The move follows the ECB’s UK£520m equity sale in The Hundred, which implied a near‑UK£1bn combined valuation for its eight teams and reset the benchmark for short‑format leagues in Tier‑1 markets.

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What makes this more than a simple privatisation story is the way CA is proposing to deploy the capital. Headlines have focused on the topline forecast, but underneath that is a detailed allocation framework: roughly AUS$100m to plug six straight years of budget deficits and stabilise the balance sheet; another AUS$100m into BBL‑specific investment, primarily via higher player payments and more aggressive marketing; around AUS$110m ring‑fenced for grassroots cricket, split between CA and the states; and approximately AUS$150m parked in a future fund ahead of the next domestic broadcast cycle.

That structure shows CA trying to convert a one‑off monetisation event into both short‑term repair and longer‑term risk management.

The BBL line item is essentially a competitiveness play. The BCG report CA commissioned recommended both opening clubs to private capital and restructuring the competition window, starting later, closer to the Boxing Day Test and pushing more games into January, so that more Australian internationals and higher‑profile overseas players can participate. A higher salary cap and more flexible scheduling are designed to keep the BBL in the top tier alongside the IPL, SA20 and MLC, at a time when player choice is increasingly driven by total earnings and portfolio careers across multiple leagues, and for investors that upside case is what underpins valuations.

The most complex piece is governance: who owns what, who controls what, and how the money flows. CA and the six state associations currently co‑own the eight BBL clubs, so any deal has two dimensions, the sale of equity in individual teams, and the subsequent distribution of proceeds between the centre and the states. The two‑club states, Cricket Victoria (Stars/Renegades) and Cricket New South Wales (Sixers/Thunder), are pushing hard to capture a larger share of any sale proceeds linked to their second licences, while single‑club states are wary of seeing an already uneven commercial landscape become structurally baked in via equity windfalls, especially if a smaller‑market state were to sell 100% of its club.

This is where the ECB precedent is instructive but not perfectly portable. In The Hundred, the governing body sold its 49% stakes and revenues were shared through an agreed national formula, ensuring all 18 first‑class counties and the recreational game captured value even if specific teams attracted stronger bids. CA is dealing with a federal structure where the states are already powerful actors and own significant IP and infrastructure around the BBL brands, so any perceived imbalance, for example, if Melbourne and Sydney clubs deliver outsized cheques that stay largely in those states, risks fragmenting what has been a relatively unified national model.

Strategically, CA’s leadership is trying to position private capital as a tool to protect, rather than threaten, the primacy of Test cricket and national teams. The BCG recommendations link private investment to schedule tweaks that give the BBL more clear air without touching the Boxing Day or New Year’s Tests, and CA has publicly framed private equity as a way to underwrite pathways and participation, not to pivot away from the long format. The risk is time horizon: investors will eventually want growth in franchise enterprise value and cash flows, which can align with CA’s purpose only if governance rights, vetoes and central control over the calendar are clearly defined.

From a global capital perspective, the BBL assets are likely to attract multi‑club owners already active in the IPL, SA20 and MLC, as well as institutional investors that now see cricket IP as a scalable, media‑driven platform. The differentiated time zone, strong existing domestic rights deals and a mature sponsorship market make Australia an attractive diversification play within a wider cricket portfolio. The real question is not whether money is available, but whether CA can design a transaction that strengthens the system holistically: repairing the balance sheet, modernising the BBL, genuinely funding the base and preserving central strategic control in the process.