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Record Revenues, Quiet Exit: Why Big Money Is Walking Away From Manchester United
Manchester United $MANU ( ▼ 3.56% ) just delivered record revenues and a cleaner P&L, yet its biggest long‑term backer is quietly heading for the exit, the stock is flat against a roaring market, and another manager has been sacked with the club sitting sixth.
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The Headline Numbers vs a Flat Stock:
Manchester United generated around £666.5 million in revenue in 2024/25, a record for the club and up roughly 0.7% year‑on‑year from about £662 million, despite no Champions League football.
Cost‑cutting has bitten: total operating expenses fell by about £34.9 million (around 4.5%), staff costs dropped by roughly £51.5 million (around 14%), and the annual net loss narrowed to about £33 million from roughly £113 million the year before.
Despite this, $MANU ( ▼ 3.56% ) share price is sitting near £12.50 per share (equivalent to about $16), down mid‑single digits over the past 12 months, while the S&P 500 is up low‑ to mid‑teens over the same period, a stark underperformance for what is supposed to be a premium global sports IP name
Chart 1: Revenue Up, Debt and Equity Stuck:
Over the last five seasons, United’s revenue line slopes steadily upward from about £494 million in 2020/21 to £666.5 million in 2024/25, while net financial debt oscillates in the £400–700 million band and still sits in the mid‑£500 millions once the revolving credit facility is included.
That leaves leverage in the ballpark of 4.5–5.0x EBITDA and limited room to self‑fund both squad investment and a stadium rebuild, which is why the “record revenue” narrative has not translated into meaningful multiple expansion in the equity chart.
Investment Takeaway: The business is getting bigger and slightly leaner, but structurally not less indebted; from an equity perspective, investors still effectively own a junior claim on a credit‑heavy balance sheet rather than a clean cash‑compounder.
Lindsell Train’s Exit vs Ariel’s Bet:
Lindsell Train, once United’s largest institutional shareholder with around 11.6 million shares at its peak, has been selling down since early 2024, including a multi‑million‑share disposal into the Ratcliffe spike at roughly £26 per share (around $33 at the time), followed by further trims through 2024.
A more recent disclosure now shows Lindsell Train at about 3.6 million Class A shares, or roughly 6.4% of that class, a reduction of around 18% from the 7.8% (about 4.38 million shares) stake reported at the end of September 2025, after selling roughly 760,000–780,000 shares in Q4.
The firm characterises the holding as passive and “in the ordinary course of business”, but the direction is unambiguous: a patient, quality‑growth manager is steadily cashing out of a levered, politically complex asset that has lagged major equity indices since the Ratcliffe premium evaporated.
Ariel Investments has moved the other way, increasing its position to about 8.9 million shares as of 30 September 2025, roughly 15–16% of the Class A float and becoming the club’s largest institutional shareholder.
Ariel’s published work frames United as mis‑priced IP: a global content engine with under‑monetised media rights, upside from a future stadium district and governance improvements under Ratcliffe’s influence, bought around the mid‑£10s per share (equivalent to the mid‑teens in dollars) where debt, stadium and performance risks are already largely in the price.
Inflection Point: United is rotating from long‑only, quality‑growth capital (Lindsell Train) to deep‑value and special‑situations capital (Ariel and peers) that are comfortable underwriting governance risk, leverage and reputational noise for optionality on a future control event and a more rational capital structure.
Amorim’s Sacking: Noise vs Signal:
Ruben Amorim’s dismissal in early January 2026, with United sitting sixth in the Premier League after previous low finishes, generated headlines but only a modest, short‑lived uptick in the share price before it settled back around £12.50 per share (approximately the sterling equivalent of $16).
Reports point to more than £200 million spent on transfers during his tenure, a Europa League final, and a Premier League win rate in the low‑30% range, underlining a familiar pattern: substantial spend, managerial churn, and league performance that does not yet match the financial scale of the club.
Investor Framing: Managers are now revolving around a fixed equity story with high leverage, partial governance change, stadium uncertainty, rather than defining it; markets no longer pay up for “new manager bounce” when the balance sheet and ownership dynamics are unchanged.
Where This Leaves Sports Investors In 2026:
At roughly £12.50 per share (around $16), United trades on an enterprise‑value‑to‑revenue multiple near 4x and EV/EBITDA in the mid‑teens: cheaper than many US blue‑chip sports franchises on a leverage‑adjusted basis, but still richer than traditional broadcasters, reflecting both its unique global IP and its unresolved capital‑structure risk.
The latest financials prove that Old Trafford can generate Premier League‑leading commercial and matchday cash without Champions League football; the charts show that until debt, stadium financing and control are reset, the equity will likely remain priced like a mid‑table stock rather than a title‑winner.
For business‑of‑sport and public‑markets investors, the current moment is a clear fork: Lindsell Train is treating United as fully valued, credit‑heavy exposure and rotating away; Ariel is underwriting the noise and buying a structurally scarce asset at mid‑teens prices, betting that a future shift in capital structure, stadium decisions or control will finally align the share price with the club’s off‑pitch scale.
That divergence between a quality manager heading for the door and a high‑conviction value shop doubling down, may be the most important “result” of this season for your subscribers: the on‑field table matters, but the shareholder table is where the next true inflection for MANU’s valuation will be decided.
How the market prices Manchester United today:
In valuation terms, football clubs are still priced primarily off revenue and cash‑flow multiples rather than any textbook P/E ratio. Mid‑tier European clubs often change hands at 1.5–3.0x revenue, but global names like United attract higher multiples if their balance sheet and stadium situation are clean. On today’s numbers, United trades at about 4x revenue and mid‑teens EV/EBITDA respectable for a listed media‑sports hybrid, but a discount to the “trophy asset” valuations you see in private deals when the buyer is taking full control and can reset capital structure. The gap between that theoretical control value and the live public multiple is exactly the spread investors like Ariel are trying to capture, while Lindsell Train is signalling that, in the current ownership and leverage set‑up, the market is already paying enough for the risk.